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PRETRIAL MEDIATION OF COMPLEX SCIENTIFIC CASES:
A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE JURY AND JUDICIAL
CONFUSION
SusAN E. COWELL*

INTRODUCTION

Would you sign a petition to ban water?

A Cambridge

economist found that seventy-six percent of surveyed respondents
condemned dihydrogen monoxide (water).1 It is questionable that
such people could serve as capable fact finders (jurors) in complex

scientific cases (such as complicated environmental torts). More than
juror ignorance is at issue: individuals serving on the bench also lack
science backgrounds. In fact, only four sitting members of the federal
judiciary reported a specific science education, resulting in their
2
inability to mitigate the lack of juror knowledge.
Consider the practical impacts of a nonscientific justice system
adjudicating complex scientific cases. Federal judges decide not only
the admissibility of scientific evidence, but also the merits, or validity,
of an expert's opinion.3 In addition, the judge's lack of a scientific
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2000; M.S., Water Chemistry, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 1995; M.S., Water Resources Management, University of WisconsinMadison, 1992; B.S., Geology, University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 1988. I thank Professor
Anita Bernstein for her invaluable guidance in preparing this Note and for her fantastic
dedication to teaching. Jamie McDole also provided valuable editing assistance.
1. See Matt Ridley, Acid Test: Dihydrogen Monoxide: Now There's a Real Killer, DAILY
TELEGRAPH LONDON, Sept. 15, 1997, at 20. One hundred twenty-three people were asked

whether the chemical dihydrogen monoxide should be strictly regulated, or even banned on the
basis of the following information:
The chemical industry routinely uses a chemical "dihydrogen monoxide" in its
processes. It is used in significant ways and often leads to spillages and other leaks and
it regularly finds its way into rivers and into our food supply. It is a major component
of acid rain. It contributes to erosion. It decreases the effectiveness of automobile
brakes. In its vapour state it is a major greenhouse gas. It can cause excessive
sweating and vomiting. Accidental inhalation can kill you. It has been found in
tumors of terminal cancer patients.
Id.

2. See Search of Westlaw, Almanac of the Federal Judiciary (June 13, 2000). There were
three sitting federal judges with engineering degrees, and one judge with a physics degree. The
educational search was performed for engineering, physics, chemistry, biology, and geology.
3. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (extending the
Daubert factors to the testimony of nonscientists such as engineers because "[Daubert] applies
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background coupled with the dizzying array of issues presented in
complex cases creates jury confusion. Simply stated, jury confusion
results in a judicial exercise in futility. Lawyers carefully present their
cases and experts may give extensive testimony, yet verdicts often
have little to do with the facts of the case. 4 Instead, juries sometimes

distribute justice on the basis of attorney tactics 5 or perceptions of
experts, 6 which is not justice.
Justice, for torts, involves the identification of those responsible
for harm and their punishment. 7 Justice, therefore, requires factfinders to analyze and weigh facts to assess responsibility. But

without tools, such as prior scientific training, to analyze scientific
issues, no fact-finder could be faulted for confusion regarding facts
based on science. These considerations led to judicial intervention, as
well as proposals to change the traditional adjudication of complex
scientific cases. These proposals, however, largely ignore using the
parties who possess the most scientific training. The opposing
scientific experts themselves possess the requisite knowledge, and it

may be possible to enhance their assistance to both judges and jurors
using pretrial mediation. Pretrial mediation can be used, with

scientific experts, to narrow issues for jury consideration and provide
judges with guidance to analyze scientific evidence.
Mediation, an alternate dispute resolution ("ADR") 8 technique,
has been used in scientific disputes. 9 Mediation is a nonbinding
proceeding conducted by a neutral third party with the goal of a

to all expert testimony"); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (allowing
judges to assess the merits of the scientific evidence); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 579-80 (1993) (forcing judges to decide the admissibility of scientific evidence under
the Federal Rules of Evidence).
4. See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 85 (1993).
5. See Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury:A Proposalfor Complex Litigation,47 DEPAUL
L. REV. 49, 56, 82 (1997).
6. See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence: VI. Addressing the Problems
of Complex and Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1583, 1585 (1995) [hereinafter
Confrontingthe New Challenges].
7. See BAILEY KULKIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 14 (1994) (describing one interpretation

of Aristotle's corrective justice for torts).
8. Although ADR encompasses a broad range of techniques such as arbitration,
mediation, fact-finding, mini-trial, facilitation, partnering, summary jury trial and conciliation,
this Note focuses on mediation.
9. See Asheem Mehta, Resolving Environmental Disputes in the Hush-Hush World of
Mediation: A Guide for Confidentiality, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521, 521 (1997); Lynn
Peterson, The Promise of Mediated Settlements of Environmental Disputes: The Experience of
EPA Region V, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 327,338 (1992).
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mutually agreeable settlement. 10 This Note argues that mediation, for
purposes of evaluating and presenting scientific claims, should bring
opposing scientific experts together to discuss issues in depth using
their full expertise, instead of constraining their discussions through
forensics.
Accordingly, this Note proposes pretrial mediation between
opposing scientific experts to reduce jury confusion and provide
judges with guidance to assess admissibility of scientific evidence and
expert opinions by eliminating and clarifying scientific issues. Part I
discusses why complex scientific cases do not conveniently fit into our
judicial system. The inherent tension between science and law has
resulted in adjudicatory procedural and substantive devices, ill suited
to the problems courts face. Next, Part II discusses the results of the
tension -the struggle to define admissible scientific evidence and jury
confusion. This Note then addresses the dissatisfaction among the
major players in the adjudicatory process (judges, jurors, and
scientists) that has led to proposals to change how our legal system
handles scientific disputes. Finally, Part III proposes a pretrial
mediation process. This pretrial mediation results in a written
document that details (1) the undisputed scientific issues, (2) disputed
issues and the reasons for continued disagreement, and (3) reasons
for objections to proposed scientific testimony.
I.

THE TENSION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND LAW

Science and law are in tension.'
Science and law possess
distinctly different goals, and different approaches to those goals.
The differing goals and methodologies of each discipline create
tension.
The results are continuing difficulties creating and
implementing scientific evidentiary standards,12 jury confusion, and
frustration with the entire judicial process.

10. See Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable
Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentialityand the
Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, BYU L. REV. 715,718 (1997).
11. See Jane Maienschien et al., Biology and Law: Challenges of Adjudicating Competing
Claims in a Democracy, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 151, 156-58 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, Evidence:
Discovery Along the LitigationScience Interface, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 381, 384-85 (1991); A. Dan
Tarlock, The Futile Search for Environmental Laws Based on "Good Science," 1 INT'L J.
BIOSCIENCES & L. 9,9-10 (1996).

12. See Tarlock, supranote 11, at 10.
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The Nature of Science

The goal of science is a well-reasoned conclusion reached by an
approved scientific method. 3 Scientists focus on the route and
reasoning leading to a conclusion rather than the "truthfulness" of the
conclusion.14 Science progresses with new information and may be
more aptly described as the continued refining of hypotheses that

approach a highly probable truth.
One example of scientific change that shattered prior
scientifically valid conclusions comes from the environmental science
community. In the span of three years, mercury concentrations in
Wisconsin lakes decreased by a factor of twenty to one-hundred
times. 15 This remarkable drop in mercury concentrations was not the
result of environmental cleanup. 16 Instead, the accepted, peerreviewed techniques underlying earlier measurements changed.', The

progression of science, in the span of three years, yielded new peeraccepted sampling protocols that resulted in vastly lower
measurements. 18
Scientific changes have also impacted litigation. The progression
of the Bendectin litigation 9 illustrates the change in scientific
certainty over time that Bendectin likely caused certain birth

defects.20 Further studies minimizing the uncertainty, inherent in
early studies, fueled the change. Unfortunately, adjudications of this
controversy continued to result in jury verdicts that clearly

13. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Daubert and the Quest for Value-Free "Scientific
Knowledge" in the Courtroom,30 U. RICH. L. REV. 85, 86 (1996).
14. "Truthfulness" is used to describe the immediate and time-tested correctness of a
conclusion.
15. See William F. Fitzgerald & Carl J. Watras, Mercury in Surficial Waters of Rural
Wisconsin Lakes, 87/88 SCI. TOTAL ENV'T 223,223, 228 (1989).
16. See id. at 223.
17. See id. at 227; see also Herbert L. Windom et al., Inadequacy of NASQAN Data for
Assessing Metal Trends in the Nation's Rivers, 25 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1137, 1137 (1991)
(noting that the United States Geological Survey National Stream Quality Accounting Network
trace metal data, collected since 1974, was unreliable because the old techniques produced
contaminated samples).
18. See Fitzgerald & Watras, supra note 15, at 223.
19. See Mike Redmayne, Expert Evidence and Scientific Disagreement,30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1027, 1063-64 (1997). The Bendectin litigation focused on whether Bendectin, an
antinausea morning sickness drug, caused birth defects. See id.
20. See id. The scientific community went from being cautious about branding the drug
Bendectin as the cause of certain birth defects to a virtual consensus that Bendectin was a cause
of the birth defects. See id.; see also Sanders, supra note 4, at 4. (discussing the transcripts of six
(there were about 1700 filed cases) Bendectin trials against Merrell Dow including the first
Bendectin case Mekdeci v. Merrell NationalLaboratory,711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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contradicted the scientific consensus. 21

Law requires a timely answer to conclude disputes, whereas
scientists prefer to leave a question open for continued testing and
refinement. 22 Advances in technology and further research make
continued evaluation both necessary and prudent to the growth and
development of science. In contrast to law, science responds to
uncertainty by delaying a final conclusion until more research is
conducted.3
B.

The Nature of Law

Law's goal is to do justice, according to legal principles rooted in
social policy, 24 by assessing responsibility at a given moment in time.2
Judges attempt to handle uncertainty through burdens of proof and
standards of evidence. 26 Our judicial system does not necessarily seek
a time-honored conclusion, it simply seeks closure of an issue.27 The
judicial system's findings are final, in the res judicata or collateral
estoppel sense, even though they may later be deemed incorrect.2
Unfortunately for law, uncertainty is inherent to science. 29 Law

attempts to address uncertainty by labeling science as good (science
that is widely accepted) or junk (science that is not widely accepted). 3
The Daubert v. Merrell Dow court equated good science as science
based on reasoning from old science, just as good legal reasoning is
21. See Redmayne, supra note 19, at 1062-63 (noting that approximately 40% of the
verdicts were in favor of the plaintiffs, though on appeal few verdicts stood).
22. See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation,74 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 16,42 (1995).
23. See id. at 42.
24. See Peter H. Schuck, Multi-CulturalismRedux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 1, 21 (1993).
25. See id. at 25.
26. See Redmayne, supranote 19, at 1075.
27. See Maienschien et al., supra note 11, at 158.
28. See Schuck, supra note 24, at 25; Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 6, at 1589
nn.41, 43 & 45 (discussing the case of Wells v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp., 615 F. Supp. 262
(N.D. Ga. 1985), affd in part and modified in part,788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986) (award reduced
to $4.2 million), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986). The case was about a plaintiff who won a $5.1
million judgment, in part based on testimony regarding an American Medical Association
article, see Hershel Jick et al., Vaginal Spermicides and CongenitalDisorders, 245 JAMA 1329
(1981), used to show that the plaintiffs birth defects were caused by the defendant's spermicide.
The article's authors, one year after the trial, stated that further research failed to confirm their
findings. See id. (referring to Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
723, 724-25 (1992)).
29. See Feldman, supra note 22, at 15.
30. See Redmayne. supra note 19, at 1075-79 (noting that law deals with uncertainty using
formal burdens of proof); Tarlock, supra note 11, at 11-12.
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based on old law or precedent. 31 While law struggles with uncertainty,
science thrives on uncertainty and has progressed to modern form,
which possesses even more uncertainty.
C. How Modern Scientific Disputes Magnify the Tension
Modern science, as opposed to nonmodern science, magnifies the
inherent tension between science and law.
Modem science,
particularly environmental science, differs from nonmodern science
because its uncertainty arises from scientific conclusions that cannot
necessarily be replicated and because it requires sifting through layers
of scientific expertise and technology.
Modern science, as used in this Note, may be thought of as
revised empiricism. "According to revised empiricist accounts,
science progresses as scientists trade in one theory for another, as
they collectively come to realize that a rival to the established theory
better satisfies the various scientific desiderata -predictive power,
simplicity, unity of theory, fruitfulness, and so on. '32 "[T]here is no
such thing as a once-and-for-all crucial experiment in which a
hypothesis is conclusively demonstrated to be false. A test for a
hypothesis is crucial not absolutely, but relative to background
'33
assumptions.
Nonmodem science, in contrast, is akin to logical empiricism.
Logical empiricists emphasize testability of science. 34
This
presupposes "that both initial conditions and observational results
can be" readily explained in "uncontestable terms, thereby enabling
the straightforward experimental confirmation or falsification of the
35
tested hypothesis.
An example of modern science illustrates how it exerts tension
on the legal system. The environmental tort depicted in the novel A
Civil Action involved trichloroethylene ("TCE") groundwater
contamination that allegedly caused residents of Woburn,
Massachusetts, to suffer adverse health effects and death.36 The
relevant scientific evidence included: results of well tests showing the
presence of TCE, geologic and hydrogeologic data to prove that the
31.
Inc., 43
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See Tarlock, supra note 11, at 12 (referring to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995), discussed infra Part D(1)(b)).
Feldman, supra note 22, at 15.
Id. at 13-14.
See id. at 9-10.
Id. at 12.
See JONATHAN HARR, A CVIL ACTION 79-81 (1996).
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TCE could have reached the city water wells from the two
defendants' properties, and that low-level exposure to TCE could
have caused the various adverse health effects and deaths. 37
The first problem is that the scientific conclusions regarding the
TCE problem are not subject to replication. A conclusion that TCE
from defendants' properties migrated to the city wells cannot be
replicated through an experiment dumping TCE on the properties to
see if it reaches the city's wells. There is also no opportunity to
directly test the assertion that TCE exposure causes the observed
health affects. Instead, experts must conduct tests using advanced
technology to produce evidence for courts to evaluate.
The second problem is that this evidence will be produced and
evaluated by specialized scientists. The evidence described above
required an army of scientific specialists. 38 These specialists bring
different terminologies and technologies into the courtroom. This
array of terminologies creates a potential for confusion. In addition,
the expert's ultimate opinion relies on the propagation of scientific
uncertainty, inherent in each methodological step, throughout the
expert's reasoning. The tension between modern science and law
arises from the necessity to sift through layers of technology and
scientific specialties that either have inherent uncertainty or create
uncertainty from confusion.
D. Science Forcedinto a Legal Mold
The court system utilizes several devices to assist in the
adjudication of scientific cases and assess the admissibility of expert
testimony. Procedures include opportunities for pretrial conferences,
evidentiary hurdles, and discretion allowing the bifurcation of trials.
At a substantive level, judges can, but seldom do, request scientific
assistance in complex cases. Finally, there are suggestions to aid
juries and increasingly more uses of ADR.
1. Procedural Methods to Handle Scientific Evidence
a. PretrialConferences
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16,19 judges conduct
37. See id. at 297-99.
3& See id. at 198-210.
39. FED. R. CIv. P. 16.
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pretrial conferences, in part to define the issues including "nature of
the claims, the theories of general and specific causation, the
defenses, and in particular the bases for disagreement among the
experts." 4 Judges may, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16(c)(8),41 refer pretrial proceedings to a magistrate judge or special
master. Some judges, however, prefer retaining pretrial control to
enhance their familiarity with cases. 42 Judges closely examine the
reasons for the dispute rather than stopping at a general statement of
43
disagreement.
In addition, judges, using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26(a)(2)(B), 44 can order the parties to submit "a detailed written
disclosure with respect to each expert witness retained to testify at
trial, including a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed
and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other information
considered by the witness in forming opinions. ' '45 These procedures
46
are designed to narrow issues for trial and cull out undisputed issues.
Judges assess expert evidence, breaking down the case in order
to facilitate case management. 47 These "steps, while not intuitively
obvious to the non-expert, may be identified in the process of issue
identification. 48 Judges perform issue assessment by using reference

guides (unless the court appoints an expert).49 These subject-specific
40. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR.,REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 15 (1994).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) provides that "[a]t any conference under this rule consideration
may be given, and the court may take appropriate action, with respect to ...(8) the advisability
of referring matters to a magistrate judge or master." Cf La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352
U.S. 249, 256-58 (1957) (indicating that the use of special masters should only be in"exceptional
circumstances").
42. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 21.
43. See id. at 15. For example, while experts often have "diametrically oppos[ing]
opinions," a close examination of the issue "may well disclose that [the expert's] differences are
the products of different starting points," or because experts possess differing philosophies, like
"acceptable risk." See id. at 16-17.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
45. Id.
Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this disclosure shall, with
respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony
in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert
testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness.
The report shall contain a complete statement of all the opinions to be expressed and
the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other information considered by the witness
in forming the opinions.
Id.
46. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 15-17.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
49. These guides are: The Reference Guide on Forensic DNA Evidence, The Reference
Guide on Epidemiology, The Reference Guide on Toxicology, The Reference Guide on Survey
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guides provide step-by-step guidance to narrow issues and assess
scientific data. The Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence,
however, cautions that "[t]he guides are not intended to instruct
judges concerning what scientific evidence should be admissible.
Instead, they outline for judges the pivotal issues in the area of
science that are often the subject of dispute between litigants."50
Judges can also order parties to narrow the issues and delineate areas
of agreement and detail points of contention.
The problem with these judicial assessments and facilitation of
pretrial discussions is that nonscientists are assessing complex
scientific data. Judges, as already discussed, lack scientific training
and voice trepidation even applying the Daubert factors 51 to assess
scientific testimony credibility, much less the validity of each scientific
proposition in a chain of logic leading to an expert's conclusion. Even
if judges order parties to narrow issues, judges lack the scientific
background to act as a catalyst to help guide and realistically assess
expert's assertions. Therefore, any judicial analysis of scientific data
or facilitation of discussions to narrow issues may not produce as indepth or efficient assessments of scientific data as a neutral scientist
could in facilitating the discussions.
b. Evidentiary Standards
In determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, federal
courts are bound by the decision contained in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc12 Before Daubert, courts assessed scientific
evidence using the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Frye v.
United States.53 Under the Frye rule, scientific evidence could be
admitted into evidence if it was commonly accepted in the scientific
community (common acceptance test).5 4 This rule was largely
55
criticized for excluding new, cutting-edge science.
Research, The Reference Guide on Statistics, The Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, The
Reference Guide on Estimation of Economic Losses in Damage Awards. See id. at 18-19. See
generally Joe S. Cecil, Limitations and Potential of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence,
36 JURIMETRICS J. 225 (1996) (providing reviews, at times critical, of the scientific content of the
manuals). But see Carey Goldberg, Judges Take Hands-On DNA Lessons, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25,
1999, §1, at 8 (reporting that many judges are attempting to use seminars to learn the basics of
genetics).
50. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 118.
51. See infra Part II(A).
52. 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993).
53. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
54. See id. at 1014.
55. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
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In Daubert, the petitioners alleged limb reduction birth defects

resulting from their mother's ingestion of Bendectin, an antinausea
drug marketed by Merrell Dow.56 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari "in light of the sharp divisions among the courts regarding
''57
the admission of expert testimony.

Considering scientific evidence, the Daubertopinion replaced the
common law test of Frye because Federal Rule of Evidence 70258
specifically addressed scientific evidence so a departure from the
rules was not warranted.5 9 The Daubert Court stated that, under the

Federal Rules of Evidence, trial judges "must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable." 6 The Court then defined four factors that judges could use
to assess scientific evidence: (1) whether the theory or technique can
be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review; (3) the potential or known rate of error; and
(4) whether the theory or technique has gained widespread
61
acceptance .
Critics contend judges lack sufficient scientific knowledge to
carry out the rule. 62 However, the Supreme Court acknowledged and

discounted this criticism after Daubert.63 The lack of clear objective
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 8 (1997).

56. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582-83.
57. See, e.g., id. at 585; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1999)
(granting certiorari "about whether, or how Daubert applies to expert testimony... as based
not upon 'scientific' knowledge, but rather upon 'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge").
58. See FED. R. EviD. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
59. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-89. Because states are not bound by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, they are not required to follow the Daubert ruling. See FAIGMAN, supra note 55, at
11-12 n.7. States fell into six categories in how they assess scientific evidence: (1) 19 states use
the essential principles of Daubert because they either adopted Daubert or previously used a
similar test; (2) eight states indicated a willingness to reconsider their scientific evidence rule;
(3) 11 states follow the Frye test or a "state formulation using general acceptance and
relevancy"; (4) six states use their own version of relevance/reliability; (5) four states remain
undecided; and (6) three states have not assessed or cited Daubert. See id
60. Daubert,509 U.S. at 589.
61. See id. at 593-94.
62. See id. at 600-01 (Judge Rehnquist's concurrence pointed out that, although Rule 702
"confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of admissibility of
proffered expert testimony[,] [he] do[es] not think that it imposes on them either the obligation
or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role."); John W.
Osborne, Judicial/TechnicalAssessment of Novel Scientific Evidence, U. ILL. L. REv. 497, 518
(1990); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
63. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147-48 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
This requirement will sometimes ask judges to make subtle and sophisticated
determinations about scientific methodology and its relation to the conclusions an
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standards has led to different court interpretations of the Daubert
decision. In Daubert,the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on remand,
seemed to equate good science with prior science, reverting back to
the premise of the Frye rule. Expanding upon the decision in

Daubert, the Supreme Court reinforced and strengthened judicial
powers to include a judicial assessment of the merits, or validity, of an
expert's

opinion 64 and has extended

Daubert to nonscientific

testimony. 65 So while the judicial system's check on junk science 66 is
sensible, giving this power to a nonscientific judiciary seems
questionable.
c.

Bifurcation

Very complex cases may be procedurally bifurcated into
causation and liability proceedings. 67 In fact, one study showed that
expert witness seeks to offer-particularly when a case arises in an area where the
science itself is tentative or uncertain, or where testimony about general risk levels in
human beings or animals is offered to prove individual causation.... [Jludges are not
scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate the making of such
decisions....
Of course, neither the difficulty of the task nor any comparative lack of expertise can
excuse the judge from exercising the "gatekeeper" duties that the Federal Rules
impose.... [t]o the contrary, when law and science intersect, those duties often must
be exercised with special care.
Id.
64. See id. at 146-47.
65. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-50 (1999).
66. Junk science has many definitions. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE:
JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 3 (1991). One definition of junk science is:
Junk science cuts across chemistry and pharmacology, medicine and engineering. It is
a hodgepodge of biased data, spurious inference, and logical legerdemain, patched
together by researchers whose enthusiasm for discovery and diagnosis far outstrips
their skill. It is a catalog of every conceivable kind of error: datadredging, wishful
thinking, truculent dogmatism, and, now and again, outright fraud.
Id.; Lisa M. Agrimonti, The Limitations of Daubert and Its Misapplication to Quasi-Scientific
Experts, A Two-Year Case Review of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2786 (1993), 35 WASHBURN L.J. 134, 156 n.45 (1995) (referring to Barry J. Nace, The Daubert
Decision, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Kansas Trial Lawyers Association and Crown
Center Seminar XXII (Dec. 1994), which noted that "[j]unk science is any science in which
there is an opinion that does not conform with the opinion that the corporations want to have
accepted"); Junkscience.com (visited Mar. 19, 1999) <http://www.junkscience.com>. Finally, the
Junk Science Home Page defines junk science as
bad science used to further a special agenda, such as personal injury lawyers extorting
deep-pocket businesses; the "food police," environmental Chicken Littles and
gun-control extremists advocating wacky social programs; overzealous regulators
expanding bureaucratic power/budgets; cut-throat businesses attacking competitors;
unethical businesses making bogus product claims; slick politicians; and wannabe
scientists seeking fame and fortune.
Id.
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) states that
[t]he court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials
will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any
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eighty-four percent of trial judges support bifurcation because it
"expedite[s] settlements and improve[s] the fairness of trial
outcomes." r It seems reasonable to assume that juries in a unitary
trial would be more easily distracted or tempted to ignore complex

issues, such as scientific evidence.
A study presenting the same complex issues to a jury in a
traditional unitary trial versus a jury in a bifurcated proceeding
confirmed that defendants benefited from the bifurcated
proceedings.69 General causation verdicts in the unitary trial favored
the plaintiff by 85.4%, as opposed to only 68.6% in the bifurcated
trial. 70
Critics of bifurcated trials are reluctant to provide the second
jury with only a portion of the case because of the jury's need to hear
the entire case to reach a decision 7' or fear of a Seventh Amendment
violation. 72 In the past, some courts actually denied the right to a trial

by jury, reasoning that there is a complexity limitation to the Seventh
Amendment, 73 or a due process violation if the case's complexity
precludes a fair decision by a jury.74 Other courts refused to read a
75
complexity exception into the Seventh Amendment.

claim... or of any separate issue ...always preserving inviolate the right of trial by
jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a
statute of the United States.
Id.
68. Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of
ProceduralChangeson Jury Decisions,73 JUDICATURE 22, 23 (1989).
69. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of
ProceduralIssues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 269 (1990). Horowitz
and Bordens conducted a study exposing jurors to a four-hour videotape of actors portraying a
toxic tort case where a company's chemical allegedly affected rivers, food supply and
recreational facilities. In addition, "plaintiffs claimed medical, economic and psychological
damage." Id. at 274-75.
70. See id. at 277.
71. See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex
Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986) (suggesting that jurors in
criminal cases need to hear the entire case to reach a decision).
72. A Seventh Amendment violation may occur if a second jury reevaluates the findings of
the first jury in a bifurcated trial and reaches a different conclusion. See In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
751 (5th Cir. 1996).
73. See In re Boise Cascade, 420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
74. See In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980).
75. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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2.

Substantive Devices Used in Complex Scientific Cases
a.

Special Masters

Judges employ special masters76 to assist in pretrial proceedings.

These individuals supervise discovery and overall case management,
make factual determinations required to rule on evidence
admissibility, and hold Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) hearings to

formulate recommendations to the judge on the admissibility of
expert testimony. 77 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(e), a

special master must file a report that, if required, makes "findings of
facts and conclusions of law. ''78 Special masters may also facilitate
settlements, or provide assistance at the liability or remedial stage of
litigation.

79

Special masters possess substantial powers under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 53. 80 According to Rule 53(c), special masters may
require the production of documents and other evidence, rule on

81
admissibility of evidence, and examine witnesses under oath.
Despite the apparent utility of special masters, they are seldom used
by the judiciary because of cost, difficulty of finding neutral experts,
and potential delay in adjudication 2
In addition, a few circuit court decisions found that special
master appointments violated Article III, requiring that judges must
try civil cases. 83 "[T]he appointment [of special masters] may
represent a deviation from the traditional adversary model of justice
by interjecting a neutral, but not passive, specialized decision-maker
into the judicial system, which otherwise depends on more passive,
generalist judges." 4

76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (governing the appointment and duties of a special master
appointed by the court).
77. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 584-85.
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e) (noting that a special master's report is treated as a source of
evidence in a jury trial). In a jury trial, the special master cannot be cross-examined regarding
her report, and parties who participated in the evidentiary trial are not entitled to discover the
report's supporting evidence. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 617-18. In a
nonjury trial, however, the report (with any conclusions or findings of fact) is accepted unless
clearly erroneous. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
79. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 586-90.
80. See FED. R. CIv. P. 53.
81. See FED. R. CIv. P. 53(c).
82. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CIVIL JURY PRACTICE STANDARDS 22 (1998).
83. See Stauble v. Warrob, Inc., 977 F.2d 690, 698 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Bituminous Coal
Operators' Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
84. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 621.
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Court-AppointedExpert Panels and Experts

Judges, under Federal Rule of Evidence 706,85 may appoint
neutral expert panels 86 or neutral experts. A neutral expert is
an expert who can respond to the technical or scientific issue in a
manner consistent with generally accepted knowledge in an area,
without regard to the interests advanced by either party. This
would rule out experts with significant ideological, financial, or
professional interests in debatable normative issues related to the
issue in dispute. 88
The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Litigation Section
issued civil practice standards governing and approving the use of
court-appointed experts. 89 Unlike special masters, a court-appointed
expert's report is subject to cross-examination. 90
An example of expert-panel usage is Hall v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp.,91 a products liability case against the manufacturers of silicone
breast implants. The judge assembled an expert panel consisting of
an epidemiologist, rheumatologist, immunologist/toxicologist, and
polymer chemist. 92 The court allowed these members to question
witnesses and provide their recommendations to the judge. 93 After
both sides had an opportunity to question the panel experts and
submit objections and proposed alternative findings, the judge
provisionally granted the defendants' motions to exclude plaintiffs'
causation testimony 94 related to any systemic disease or syndrome. 95
In Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., the judge appointed an
expert to assess whether the plaintiffs' use of one data point was
scientifically sound. 96 The Renaud case involved plaintiffs who
alleged they were injured from contaminated drinking water caused

85. See FED. R. EvID. 706 (describing expert appointment and compensation).
86. See Gates v. United States, 707 F.2d 1141, 1142, 1144 (10th Cir. 1983) (a panel of
experts appointed under Rule 706 assisted the trial court).
87. See FED. R. EvID. 706.
88. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 544-45 n.48.
89. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 82, at 20-23.
90. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 618.
91. 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
92. See id. at 1392-93 (appointing experts to assist in the "gatekeeper" role imposed by the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
93. See id. at 1393-94.
94. See id. at 1395 n.19 (indicating that the judge would defer the effective date of his
opinion and possibly reconsider his decision based upon the findings of an appointed national
expert panel in pending multidistrict litigation).
95. See id. at 1394.
96. 749 F. Supp 1545,1553 (D. Colo. 1990), affd, 972 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1992).
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by the defendant manufacturer. 97 The plaintiffs extrapolated their
exposure over eleven years from a single data point that the court
expert determined was "[an] unsound scientific practice." 98 The judge
found that the evidence proved "at most that there was a possibility
that the plaintiffs were exposed to contaminants" 99 and granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 1°°
A survey of active federal district court judges'0 1 found that
twenty percent had appointed an expert under Rule 706,102 and
ninety-seven percent of those judges were satisfied with the expert. 103
Judges who appointed experts used them to assist the court's decision
making or to aid settlement. 1°4 The reasons that judges cited for a
failure to appoint experts were cost, 05 infrequency of cases requiring
an expert, and respect for the adversarial system.' °6 "Many [judges]
who had appointed experts professed commitment to the adversarial
process and the ability of juries to assess difficult evidence, and they
indicated that they would appoint an expert only where the
adversarial process failed." 1 7 Thus, if judges do not use experts,
perhaps juries can be assisted in better understanding complex cases.
c.

Methods to Enhance Jury Comprehension

Proposals suggest aiding jury comprehension though various
methods. The ABA's Litigation Section proposed standards gathered
from various state and federal courts to enhance juror
comprehension. °8 Jury proposals relate to improving comprehension
and reducing the volume of material that jurors must consider. One
example of enhancing comprehension allows jurors to take notes or
even question witnesses. 1°9 Comprehension might also be enhanced
97. See id. at 1547.
98. Id. at 1553.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 1555.
101. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 535 n.30 (noting that survey results
consisted of 431 returned questionnaires out of 537).
102. See id. at 535.
103. See id. at 537.
104. See id.
105. Court-appointed expert compensation generally comes from the parties. Some judges
indicated that the problems of allocating the cost among the parties, prompt payment during the
tenure of the expert, and resistance by the parties to pay court-appointed experts often
discourages the court from appointing an expert. See id at 557.

106. See id. at 540.
107. Id. at 542.
108. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 82,at iv.
109. See Keith Broyles, Taking the Courtroominto the Classroom:A Proposalfor Educating
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by using neutral experts, or party-selected experts who could explain
the general fundamentals of complex scientific issues to the jury. 110
Another commentator suggested that judges provide preliminary jury
instructions and explain the issues at the start of trial, giving jurors a
framework for assessing the evidence."' Juror comprehension would
112
also improve if legal and technical terms could be avoided at trial.
Finally, having experts testify in succession (an expert immediately
followed by his opposing expert) would allow the jury to assess
opposing viewpoints while the first expert's testimony is still fresh in
11 3
jurors' memories.
Reducing the issues that juries hear might be accomplished by
4
bifurcating the trial into general and specific causation portions."
Judges may also limit the scope or length of the trial to reduce the
volume of proof that the jury must assimilate.1 5 Finally, judges could
reduce the number of issues by having the parties stipulate to matters
not reasonably disputed." 6

d. ADR Uses
ADR mechanisms are not new to scientific disputes,"7 or the
court system.'18 The Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA")
issued guidelines governing the use of such mechanisms, 9 including
granting confidentiality to mediation sessions. 20 For example,
mediation in Superfund cases is appropriate to evaluate the strengths
of opposing party's cases especially if the disputants can use
mediation "to reach an equitable settlement that avoids.., trial costs
the Lay Jurorin Complex Litigation Cases, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714,732-35 (1996); cf Larry
Heuer & Steven Penrod, IncreasingJurors' Participationin Trials: A FieldExperiment with Jury
Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 231 (1988) (noting that a survey
concluded that juror notetaking had no strong advantages or disadvantages).
110. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 34.
111. See id. at 35.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 34.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 35.
117. See generally Maienschien et al., supra note 11; Mehta, supra note 9; Peterson, supra
note 9.
118. See generally ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., MEDIATION &
CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR
JUDGES AND LAWYERS (1997); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1992).

119. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES IN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (1987).

120. See id. at D2.
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exceeding the costs of actual site cleanup.' 121 The EPA identified
allocation of costs among parties, cost documentation, remedy issues,
as well as compliance with EPA requests and consent orders, as
2
potentially appropriate issues for mediation.1 2
Currently, all thirteen United States Courts of Appeal have
mediation programs,'21 which are permitted by Rule 33 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 124 The program objectives include
improving case management, 25 which can "help parties simplify or
clarify issues... [which have] the potential to streamline the
appellate process, even when the cases do not settle."126 Appellate
mediation conferences generally occur before briefs are filed.
Circuits may select cases that appear likely to settle, randomly select
cases meeting minimum requirements, or allow nearly all civil cases
to be eligible. 127 These mediations are confidential and facilitative
(the mediator, as a neutral party, "helps disputants resolve problems,
evaluate positions, and proceed toward settlement"), '1 though the
First and Second Circuits permit mediators to make predictions of the
29
probable outcome of the case if it were to go before the court.
The United States Department of Justice (the "DOJ"),
implementing the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1991, issued guidelines
for ADR federal court litigation. 13° The DOJ advocated several forms
of ADR ("arbitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation, factfinding and mini-trials")"' for cases that have the characteristics of
impasse or have a potential for impasse, and for efficiency
121. Peterson, supra note 9, at 348.
122. See id. at 350-66.
123. See NIEMIC, supra note 118, at 3.
124. FED. R. APP. P. 33 provides:
The court may direct the attorneys, and in appropriate cases the parties, to participate
in one or more conferences to address any matter that may aid in the disposition of the
proceedings, including the simplification of the issues and the possibility of settlement.
A conference may be conducted in person or by telephone and be presided over by a
judge or other person designated by the court for that purpose. Before a settlement
conference, attorneys must consult with their clients and obtain as much authority as
feasible to settle the case. As a result of a conference, the court may enter an order
controlling the course of the proceedings or implementing any settlement agreement.
Id.
125. See NIEMIC, supra note 118, at 4.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 5-6.
128. See Patrick Mead & Ed Newcomer, Jr., Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Glossary
of Terms, WASH. STATE BAR NEWS, Apr. 1993, at 25.
129. See NIEMIC, supra note 118, at 8.
130. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 118, at 1.
131. Id. at 3.
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considerations. 13 2 The DOJ uses mediation to "structure negotiations
[and to provide] a catalyst between the parties... during the course
of negotiations.' 1 33 In comparison, fact-finding uses a neutral expert
to independently investigate the facts specified by the parties and
issue a finding. This finding may then be used by the parties for
settlement discussions or by a judge in the litigation. 1 4135Additionally,
the ADR forms discussed by the DOJ are confidential.
II. THE RESULTS OF THE TENSION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND LAW
Although the loser will always grumble, when major players in a
process complain, something may be wrong with the process. Judges
express concerns and conduct their cases with implicit hesitation
when carrying out scientific assessments. 13 Jurors implicitly express
confusion when deciding complex issues. Scientists criticize the legal
process. As a result, these parties and commentators have proposed
changes to our current adjudicatory system.
A.

JudicialFrustrationwith the Current System

Judges voice hesitation when attempting to assess scientific
evidence under the Daubert standards. 137 Judges indicate that there
are four basic reasons why they need scientific or technical knowledge
in order to: (1) "evaluate scientific or technical evidence ... and to

rule on objections to evidence"; (2) "assess claims and facilitate
settlement"; (3) educate themselves or jurors in the particular subject
1 38
matter; and (4) "scientifically analyze and evaluate other evidence.'
Cases indirectly indicate that judges are uncomfortable applying
and analyzing all of the Daubert factors. The Ninth Circuit, on
remand from the Supreme Court, applied a new factor of whether39
scientific research was conducted independent of the litigation.
132. Id. at 13-14.
133. Id. at 5.
134. See id. at 8.
135. See id. at 19 (stating that when public agencies are involved, if documents are disclosed
to a third party, like a mediator, they may no longer be confidential under the Freedom of
Information Act).
136. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d. 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); Officer v.
Teledyne Republic/Sprague, 870 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D. Mass. 1994).
137. A Ninth Circuit Daubert judge stated, "Our responsibility, then, unless we badly
misread the Supreme Court's [Daubert] opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, wellcredentialed scientists about matters squarely within their expertise." Daubert,43 F.3d at 1316.
138. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 583.
139. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317 n.5.

20001

PRETRIAL MEDIATION OF COMPLEX SCIENTIFIC CASES

Other courts place a lot of weight on the general acceptance factor
without fully analyzing the other factors. 14 Daubert itself created a
loophole for judges by allowing them to take judicial notice of other
court acceptances of science."4' Some circuits did categorize evidence
as nonscientific so they did not need to apply Daubert 42 This
practice, however, should be curtailed by the recent Supreme Court
14
decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,'
which extends Daubert
4
to the testimony of experts, not just experts who are scientists.'
B.

Scientist Dissatisfactionwith the Current System

The scientific community welcomed judicial oversight, at least in

theory. 145 Like other disciplines, science suffers from its share of
fraud and misrepresentation.146 In addition to calls for science courts,
scientists have also suggested greater use of neutral experts.

47

The

criticism of current judicial oversight is that it assesses science using
nonscientific premises. 148 Only two of the four Daubert factors
directly involve scientific merit (peer review and general acceptance),
while the remaining two factors (testability and known rate of error)
49

only provide proxies for merit.
Scientific merit cannot be readily ascertained by peer review
because, despite widespread belief, peer reviewers do not replicate

findings reported in articles nor does peer review and publication
confer truth, accuracy, validity, reliability, or certainty to the

science. 50 Peer review does not mean that the published article is
140. See, e.g., Officer, 870 F. Supp. at 410.
141. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584-85 (1993); Erica BeecherMonas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L.
REV. 55, 102 n.122 (1998) (noting "the danger [is] that one or two jurisdictions will determine
the admissibility of a given category of evidence and others will simply ride their coattails,
turning the old general acceptance test on its head by making it acceptance by other courts
rather than other scientists").
142. See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1157 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1127
(1997); lacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19,25 (2d Cir. 1994).
143. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
144. See id. at 148.
145. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 390.
146. See id. at 388-90 (referring to Nobel Prize winner David Baltimore's withdrawal of a
paper after it became known that some of the data it used was faked, and the presence of the
National Institutes of Health's Office of Scientific Integrity (which some call the science
police)).
147. See Tarlock, supra note 11, at 17.
148. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 392.
149. See FAIGMAN, supra note 55, at 18.
150. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, SECTION OF SCIENCE &
TECH., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE REVIEW: MONOGRAPH NO. 2, at 19-20 (Marc S. Klein et al. eds.,
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"generally accepted" and the fact that information has not been peer
reviewed does not mean it cannot be "generally accepted.""' In
addition, some journals accept and use author-nominated reviewers. 15 2
Different journals are also not equal in quality so publication in
"weaker" journals is not likely to exclude "bad" science. 1 3 Finally,
judges determine the weight of peer review, rather than scientists who
are readily familiar with the reputation of specific journals and the
corresponding quality of the journal's peer review process.
The general acceptance factor, retained from Frye, fails to
recognize cutting-edge science. Judges are called upon to determine
exactly when a proposition receives general acceptance, and also to
define the relevant field that must confer general acceptance. 4
Therefore, the narrower the court determines the pertinent field, the
more likely the court finds general acceptance. 1 5 "The general
acceptance test thus degrades into a process of deciding whose noses
can count... [so] [b]ecause the pertinent field can be so readily
manipulated, the test by itself provides courts with little protection
6
against shoddy science.' 1
Testability of science goes to the status of a statement as either
scientific or nonscientific. 51 7 Unfortunately, the Daubert Court did
not specify how testability is determined. Judges may assess
testability by examining empirical test results; but unless judges
develop some scientific expertise to separate valid research from
"research designed merely to supply impressive looking graphs and
imposing numbers," they will not be able to properly determine the
issue's testability.5 8 Complicating this task is the fact that research is
1994).
151. See id. at 20.
152. The Journalof EnvironmentalScience & Technology requires authors to submit names
of three or four experts in their field for possible reviewers. The publication states that "[t]he
technical editors try to use at least one reviewer from [the author's list]" and it typically assigns
two or three reviewers to each article. See Journal of Environmental Science & Technology,
Editorial Policy (visited Feb. 12, 1999) <http://acsinfo.acs.org/instruct/esthag.pdf>.
Science
Magazine requests that manuscripts be submitted with the names of four to six potential
referees. Science Magazine, Information to Authors/Contributors(visited Feb. 12, 1999) <http://
www.sciencemag.org/misc/con-info.shtml>.
Nature allows authors to suggest independent
reviewers, though Nature may not follow the suggestions. See Nature, Nature Extended Guide
to Authors (visited Feb. 12, 1999) <http://www.nature.con/author/guide.html>.
153. See FAIGMAN, supra note 55, at 27-28.
154. See id. at 8-9.
155. See id. at 9.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 20.
158. Id. at 21.

200

PRETRIAL MEDIATION OFCOMPLEX SCIENTIFIC CASES

not a cookie-cutter pursuit so there are many different ways to
conduct valid research. 5 9
The final Daubert factor, rate of error, looks at a method's
propensity for mistake. 160 The most important source of error is the
research method itself, and may include variables such as sample size,
sample population selection, and apparatuses used.' 6' Scientists rely
on iterations with various research methods over time to reduce the
rate of error and develop acceptance. 162 Unfortunately, law does not
have the luxury of waiting until error is reduced.
All of the Daubert factors involve the intimate details of
everyday scientific life. Scientists, rather than judges, are best able to
understand the subtleties of each factor to reach a conclusion of
scientific soundness.
In addition, judges and scientists think
differently. Judges tend to focus on the evidentiary bottom line,
whether specific study results should be accepted, 63 whereas scientists
focus on the route leading to the results. Lecturers for continuing
judicial education find that judges do not focus on general principles
of data assessment, instead they focus on snippets from individual
cases. 64 One lecturer warned that "unless the judge understands the
principles that underlie the details, the result can be the
misapplication of rules that have no bearing on the situation."' 165
While these factors are confusing enough to judges, our adversarial
system also demands that juries assess complex science.
C. Jury Confusion
Jury confusion is often attributable to both lack of juror scientific
understanding and the use of scientific experts in our judicial system.
Studies show that adults lack basic scientific knowledge; one survey
found that over fifty percent of Americans did not know that the
Earth revolved around the sun once per year. 166 The study also found
that "[t]eaching is a profession in crisis ... [w]e are currently losing

159. See id.
160. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,594 (1993).
161. See FAIGMAN, supra note 55, at 26-27.
162- See id. at 27.
163. See John M. Conley & David W. Peterson, Essay: The Science of Gatekeeping: The
FederalJudicial Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1183,
1205-06 (1996).
164. See id.
165. Id. at 1206.
166. See GERALD HOLTON, SCIENCE AND ANTI-SCIENCE 147 (1993).
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thirteen mathematics and science teachers for each one entering the
profession1 6 7 so the prospects of rectifying scientific illiteracy is grim.

In addition, because of juror selection biases, there is little reason to
hope that people available for jury service will exceed these dismal

averages. In fact, a juror study revealed that, overall, thirty percent of
jurors have difficulty understanding even one to five words, terms or

concepts in judge's instructions.168 But even if some juror ignorance
could be mitigated, the civil justice system would still depend on
expert witnesses because of the complexity of issues.
Unfortunately, the way that scientific experts are used in the
adversarial system undercuts their idealized role as teachers and
guides through a scientific maze. Scientific experts have become a

pawn in the tactical game of adjudication. Considering the estimated
$200 million industry of jury consulting, 169 the strategic use of
scientific experts and lawyer tactics is not too surprising.

An

example, as some commentators suggest, is the use of unequal
numbers of experts on both sides of a controversy that can cause jury
confusion. 170 In addition, juries sometimes assess the characteristics of
the expert rather than her substantive testimony.'

Attorney tactics also play a part in juror confusion. Thus, in
complex cases, where issues are not straightforward, attorney tactics

will likely factor more heavily into jury decisions. Examples of such
techniques are distraction of the jury during the opposition's
testimony or a relentless attack of witness credibility, even though the
attorney knows that the witness is conveying the truth. 72 Attorneys
also play on the emotions of juries and routinely work to create a

"likeability factor" with juries. 173 Especially when there is a mismatch
of attorney skills, juries sometimes judge the attorneys and not the
cases. 174

175
In short, the adversarial process can mislead jurors.

167. Id.
168. See Strier, supra note 5, at 80.
169. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Juries: They May Be Broken, but We Can Fix Them, 44
FED. LAW. 20,23 (1997).
170. See Redmayne, supra note 19, at 1068.
171. See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 6, at 1585-86 (describing jurors'
negative attitude toward one expert because they felt an expert was overpaid and that there was
a social gap between the jurors and the expert).
172. A survey found that 30% of jurors felt that one or both attorneys attempted to distort
or hide facts instead of revealing the truth for the jury. See Strier, supra note 5, at 82.
173. See id. at 56-57.
174. A survey found that 36% of jurors that perceived a decision (verdict, award size, or
sentence length) as wrong attributed it either partially or significantly to differences between
opposing attorneys' courtroom skills. See id. at 57, 83.
175. See id. at 55 (describing the findings of a study of an asbestos case from MOLLY SELVIN
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Although this phenomenon may occur in all trials, it seems plausible
that jurors in complex scientific cases, with their previously discussed
lack of scientific knowledge, would have a greater tendency to

discount scientific information and look to the extraneous factors of
attorney tactics to reach a decision.
Of course attorneys could argue that they are complying with
their code of ethics. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct states

that attorneys have an obligation to represent their clients zealously
within the bounds of the law. 176
The Federal Rules of Evidence represent rules that lawyers must
follow in federal court.177 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence the

majority of relevant evidence is admissible, 178 but is limited by Federal
Rule of Evidence 403.179 Therefore, if an attorney litigates an issue
that is really undisputed and low in probative value, Rule 403 is
violated and such conduct is not permitted, even from the zealous
advocate.
D. Proposalsto Change the CurrentAdjudicatory System
Despite the judicial devices and ADR uses, both the legal and

scientific communities call for changes in how the judicial system
handles scientific cases. 18° These proposals include: a science court,
methods to directly address jury confusion, and increased use of
ADR procedures.
& LARRY PIcuS, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT
ASBESTOS CASE 45-46 (1987)).
176. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1999).

A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client ... and may take whatever
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A
lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.
Id.
177. FED. R. EviD. 101 (stating that the federal rules govern proceedings in the United
States courts).
178. FED. R. EV.
402 provides that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules,
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible." In turn, "'[rielevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
179. FED. R. EVID. 403 states that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
180. See Broyles, supra note 109. See generally Task Force of the Presidential Advisory
Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Tech., The Science Court Experiment. An
Interim Report, 193 SCIENCE 653 (1976).
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1. Science Court Proposal
In the mid-1970s, scientists proposed and supported a science
court. 8 ' Scientists would staff the science courts, who would entertain
scientific issues that pertained to public decisions. 82 The proposed
science court was to be an adversarial proceeding among scientists to

decide scientific facts ("a result, or more frequently the anticipated
result, of an experiment or an observation of nature"), 183 as opposed
to social value decisions.

84

Examples of science court subjects include whether "water
supplies be fluorinated" or if "Red Dye #40 [is] safer than Red Dye

#2."18 The result would be a series of factual statements, including
statements regarding uncertainty, and suggestions of areas that
required additional research. 186
This proposal left science to the scientists, but would not reach

many legal disputes that do not, or would not, rely on the selected
issues. During the past twenty-five years, these science court
variations all failed.

87

2.

Jury Proposals

Other proposals directly address juries in complex cases. One
proposal suggests that juries be partially composed of collegeeducated individuals,' s8 while other commentators suggest educating
jurors in complex cases, 189 or allowing notetaking and juror
questions.' 9° A college-educated jury has superficial appeal, but
critical legal scholars1 9' would, no doubt, object to confining the
181. See id. at 656 (listing other science court proposals in its bibliography).
182. See id. at 653 (noting that the panel of scientists acting as judges should not be experts
in the contested subject matter or possess any bias toward the subject matter).
183. Id. at 656.
184. See id. at 653.

185. Id.
186. See id.
187. See Confronting the New Challenges,supra note 6, at 1604; Arthur Kantrowitz, Elitism
vs. Checks and Balances in Communicating Scientific Information to the Public (visited Mar. 3,

1999) <http://www.fplc.edu/risk/vol4/spring/kantro.html> (noting that "[iut gradually became
clear that although both sides of the Washington politics-science complex would give lip service
to the need for new procedures, they were unwilling to aid in creating an institution that might
not be easy to control").
188. See Strier, supra note 5, at 79.
189. See Broyles, supra note 109, at 742-44 (suggesting that jurors receive instruction from a
neutral "educator" regarding "subject matter, terminology, and foundation for the evidence and
arguments that will be presented at trial").
190. See id at 733-34.
191. Critical legal scholars argue such rules protect the socially powerful at the expense of
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adjudication of disputes to the most powerful members of society.
Also, assisting jurors by allowing notetaking and questioning could
help alleviate the problem of jury confusion, but the fact remains that
the substance of a case may still be confusing.
3.

ADR Proposals

In an extensive report detailing the problems of mass torts, the
ABA's Commission on Mass Torts suggested that legislation be
enacted to enable courts to convene one or more impartial experts for
factual disputes of a scientific or technical nature and to require
parties to enter ADR provided that a right to a jury trial is not denied
or impaired. 192 Additionally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governing pretrial conferences have several subsections that would
193
allow ADR.
Professor Debrah Hensler'94 urges the use of ADR in scientific
disputes.19 She defines ADR as "mechanisms that are designed to

reduce the probability of a dispute going to trial through the use of a
the socially weak and should be avoided. See KULKIN & STEMPEL, supra note 7, at 175.
192- See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON MASS TORTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, NO. 126, at iii-iv (1989).
193. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) notes:
At any conference under this rule consideration may be given, and the court may take
appropriate action, with respect to
(1) the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the elimination of
frivolous claims or defenses;
(3) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid
unnecessary proof, stipulations regarding the authenticity of documents, and advance
rulings from the court on the admissibility of evidence;
(4) the avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumulative evidence, and limitations or
restrictions on the use of testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence;
(9) settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when
authorized by statute or local rule;
(12) the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult or
protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal
questions, or unusual proof problems;

(16) such other matters as may facilitate the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition
of the action.
194. Professor Hensler is Senior Social Scientist at the RAND Institute for Civil Justice and
Visiting Professor of Social Science in Law at the University of Southern California Law Center.
195. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court.Is There a Role for Alternative
Dispute Resolution?, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (1991); see also Confronting the New
Challenges, supra note 6, at 1601 (noting that mediation in complex cases avoids decisionmakers lacking a technical background, which is preferred because the "parties will understand
the intricacies and scientific aspects of their dispute," but presents mediation only as a way to
settle disputes).
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neutral third party," specifically excluding "procedures that are solely
intended to expedite or reduce the costs of the pretrial process
... since they are not formally directed at resolving the dispute.' 1 96
Focusing on settlement, Professor Hensler describes the use of expert
panels and mediation as well as other varieties of ADR (early neutral
evaluation, summary jury trials, conciliation procedures, mini-trials,
and arbitration).197
Professor Hensler describes mediation as aiding the parties to
reach a mutually acceptable resolution, which may include innovative
settlement terms beyond monetary damages.1 98 For example, a tort
mediation agreement may include provisions for "future
environmental testing or ongoing physical exams of classes of
claimants."199 Litigants have used mediation when disputes became
"ripe" (costs of litigation outweighed costs of settlement) for
settlement.2"0 Expert panels, according to Professor Hensler, "assess
the substantive evidence" and advise attorneys, parties and their
experts of the "strengths and weaknesses of each side's case." 20' This
assessment serves as a basis for settlement talks.20
4.

Shortcomings of Discussed ADR Uses and Proposals

The discussed current ADR uses and proposals focus on
settlement and emphasize confidentiality. This Note does not focus
on settlement or complete confidentiality because a settlement focus
promotes nonadversarial adjudication (uncomfortable to many
members of the judiciary) and confidentiality removes information
and disputes from public view.
Critics of mediation largely raise concerns of privatization of
justice. 20 3 By removing disputes from the public forum of the courts,
justice becomes "privatized" and society fails to benefit from the
dispute because of the process' confidentiality.2
Professor Fiss205
196. Hensler, supra note 195, at 180.

197. Id. at 187.
198. Id. at 184-85.
199. Id. at 185.
200. See id. at 187.
201. Id. at 181.

202. See id.
203. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073,1085-86 (1984).
204. See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through

ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 241, 246 (1996). But see Kentra, supra note 10, at 717,
722 (noting that confidentiality is mediation's strength).
205. Professor Fiss is Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Public Law at Yale University.
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comments that parties removed from the judicial process may not
understand community norms of behavior. 2°6 In the environmental
context, community norms manifest themselves as acceptable risk
given acceptable scientific uncertainty. 2° The court and jury serve as
the societal check on and moderator of behavior; court officials,
unlike mediators, are subject to political accountability.2(1 Professor
Fiss concludes that "[aldjudication is more likely to do justice than
conversation, [or] mediation... precisely because it vests the power
of the state in officials who act as trustees for the public, who are
highly visible, and who are committed to reason. '' 2°9 This strong
argument against removing disputes from the courts, and public view,
assumes a mediation predicated on settlement, like Professor
Hensler's suggestions and current uses of ADR in the courts.

III. PROPOSED PRETRIAL MEDIATION METHOD
Science should be left to the scientists to the fullest possible
extent. Scientists are in the best position to assess opposing science.
In a mediation process, the mediator guides assessments and
facilitates discussions regarding further clarification of scientific
issues. Ideally, some issues will be agreed upon, while others will be
more tightly framed for later jury consideration. The proposed
mediation is a modification of a general mediation model, does not
focus on settlement, is not entirely confidential, and exists to assist
fact-finders and judges rather than supplant them. A brief discussion
of general mediation provides a framework for this proposal.
A.

Overview of a GeneralMediation

There are mediation model variations, but a general mediation is
a confidential process conducted by a neutral third party to assist the
This
disputants to reach a mutually agreeable settlement.2 10
mediation model proceeds through the following steps: opening
statements, framing of issues, opportunities for disputants to engage
211
in discussion, and caucusing.
206. Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1672-73 (1985).
207. See Tarlock, supra note 11, at 17.
20& See Fiss, supra note 203, at 1085.
209. Fiss, supra note 206, at 1673.
210. See Mehta, supra note 9, at 523.
211. See CENTER FOR CONFLICr RESOLUTION, MEDIATOR TRAINING (1998) (on file with
the Center for Conflict Resolution, Chicago, Illinois).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:981

Each party is given an opportunity to give a brief opening
statement, providing an overview of the dispute from that party's
perspective. 212 Then the mediator frames identified disputed issues,
213
thereby providing the agenda for the remainder of the mediation.
Next, the mediator directs the parties through the issues, encouraging
parties to explain their position to the opposing party, instead of the
mediator (because the mediator is not the decision-maker).
Generally, after the parties discuss the issues, the mediator privately
214
caucuses with each party.
Mediators caucus to make sure that each party understands the
opposing party's arguments, and also to "reality test" positions taken
by the individual party.215 Reality testing forces the party to
realistically view their position with respect to the opposition's
evidence and possibly with respect to what may occur if the dispute is
brought before a judge.216 The goal is to have the disputants reach a
mutually agreeable settlement, or at least a much better
understanding of the dispute.
Mediation advocates believe mediation is superior to traditional
adjudication because it helps maintain party control, is efficient (in
both cost and time), and confidential. 217 Party control of an
agreement brings party satisfaction to the process and is believed to
increase agreement compliance.218 Confidentiality enables parties to
be more forthcoming with information, which will aid discussions and
9
make settlement possible.1
B.

Proposalfor Mediation in Complex Scientific Cases

A knowledgeable mediator, guiding a fact-finding (investigation
of disputed issues) discussion between the parties, should be used in
complex scientific cases.
This Section describes the proposed
mediation in terms of timing and function, mediator selection and
cost, end written product, and process, and provides a hypothetical
example of the proposed mediation strategy.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See Kentra, supra note 10, at 719-20.
See id. at 720.
See id.
See CENTER FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 211.
See id.
See Kentra, supra note 10, at 720-22.

21& See id. at 718.
219. See idLat 722.
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1.

Mediation Timing and Function

The proposed pretrial mediation commences after discovery is
largely complete (although additional discovery may be performed if
needed to facilitate the discussions). The mediation's function is to
hone issues for both the judge and jury. Discussions between
opposing experts and a neutral mediator should proceed more
quickly than a pretrial conference conducted by a judge simply
because the parties readily "speak the same language." Time spent at

this early stage on educating a judge is misspent if some issues drop
out later as undisputed or if they need to be better honed for

understanding.
2.

Mediator Selection and Cost

Opposing parties agree on the need for expert mediators, though

for different reasons. 20 Because the training for mediation is not
onerous,2 21 scientific organizations and agencies 222 or private
mediation services

23

would be asked to provide such experts. Like

the mediators in appellate court programs, these mediators would
either be volunteers with mediation training or the court could

provide training. 224 Parties would select the mediator.225 (If the
parties could not agree, the court would make a selection of qualified

scientists from a master list kept by the court.)
Although the emphasis is on neutral experts, some may argue
that scientists have personal biases and many reputed scientists

disagree. The point of this proposal, however, is not to adjudicate
science, but to eliminate undisputed issues22 6 and detail the route and
220. A survey conducted by a private mediation provider showed that 44% of parties felt
that technical expertise was important, while 92% of the parties felt that a technical expert as a
negotiator would save money. See Kelly A. Fox, Survey Tracks Use of ADR of Environmental
Disputes, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1995, at 14, 14.
221. See, e.g., Illinois Not-For Profit Dispute Resolution Act, 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/2
(West 1987) (stating that 30 hours of training is required to become a mediator in Illinois).
222. Examples include: the National Academy of Sciences, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, the United States Geological Survey, the Center for Disease and Control,
and the Army Corps of Engineers.
223. At least one private alternative dispute company has a scientific division. See JAMSEndispute, The Environmental Dispute Forum (visited Mar. 6, 1999) <http://www.jamsendispute.com/why/environmental/index.html> (offering "a nationwide panel of neutral dispute
resolvers" and the "establishment and management of expert neutral panels").
224. See NIEMIC, supra note 118, at 10.
225. Cf FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 545 (presenting survey results stating
that 41 of 66 judges appointed experts without party input).
226. See Kantrowitz, supra note 187. Dr. Kantrowitz (relying upon two university
experiments of the proposed science court procedure) noted that scientist-advocates were
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reasoning for continued disagreement of disputed issues. This
proposal's mediation is facilitative, and mediator training would
remind scientist-mediators that their own viewpoints regarding
conclusions are not to be interjected into the mediation. The
scientist-mediator's role is to efficiently get the issues on the table for
party discussion, guide the discussion, and focus the parties to explain
their conclusions and reasoning.
Similar to the cost of court-appointed experts, parties would
share the cost of the mediation.
Unlike settlement-focused
mediation, parties have more incentive to participate in pretrial
mediation because the focus is not on removing the dispute from the
227
judicial system and the procedural process that parties favor.
Removal of undisputed issues and framing specific points of dispute
in a step-wise fashion reduces trial time and jury confusion by
focusing a jury's attention solely on disputed facts. There is no reason
to retain undisputed issues just as tactical ploys for attorneys to shield
the weak points of their cases by confusing juries as to what the real
issues are. Evidence shows that juries are not predictable, and it is
doubtful that clients would permit the attorneys to waste time and
money litigating a largely useless piece of evidence.
3. The Mediation Process
The pretrial mediation process is the same as the general model
except the goal is to reduce the number of disputed issues and explore
the reasoning of each issue. Issues still disputed after a mediation
would be detailed by providing the route and reasoning of each
assertion with its corresponding opposition in a written report.
One potential problem is that formal rules of evidence are not
used during mediations. The possibility of "bad" science entering the
discussions should be mitigated by the expert's impatience and
knowledge to quickly weed out useless information, as well as the
sharing of mediation costs between the parties. (Because parties are
sharing the costs of mediation, there is little incentive to prolong the
proceedings.) Conversely, there may be an incentive for attorneys to
more carefully tailor their cases and prepare their experts. Of course,
there is a risk that some parties may use the increased cost of a
"almost always" in agreement with factual statements that supported their positions so that a
joint statement could be easily negotiated. Id.
227. See Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science
Perspective on Civil ProcedureReform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 882-83 (1997) (noting that
research indicates that people care most about the process by which their case was handled).
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prolonged mediation as a tactic. This risk could be eliminated
through the power of a mediator to issue a separate report that would
detail the party's continued presentation of erroneous information,
which later could be used by a judge to impose sanctions upon the
228
uncooperative party.
Confidentiality would be accorded to the mediation session itself
(to allow parties to be forthcoming), but the final end-product, the
written report, would become part of the court record. The idea of a
written report is supported by the ABA's Civil Procedure Standard
11, which provides that all communications between the court and
expert, as well as between parties and the court expert, be available in
229
written form.
Ideally, the report would be generated by the parties. However,
the mediator could also issue a report to fill gaps intentionally left by
the parties, but could not contradict a party agreement. This would
encourage parties to actively participate in the process and assure that
the judge receives some scientific guidance. The written report would
stipulate agreements with respect to particular issues or subissues.
Disputed issues, including the admissibility of scientific evidence,
would be delineated along with the reasons for each disputed point.
4.

The Written Report from the Mediation

The written report would serve two functions. First, it would
refine the dispute for the jury. Second, it would provide the judge
with guidance concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence. As
previously discussed, 23 ° jury confusion could be mitigated through the
use of juror notebooks. Jurors, however, may lack the background to
follow the dispute and categorize the issues. The written report
would serve as an outline of the issues and reasons for disputed
issues; this would help jurors follow the arguments and put each piece
of evidence in proper perspective. If parties eliminated some issues
through agreement, the jury would be presented with fewer issues so
jury confusion is reduced. Jury comprehension should also be
enhanced through a more structured, honed dispute.
The second function of the written report is that judges receive a
228. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (giving judges the authority to issue sanctions "if a party or
party's attorney fails to participate in good faith").
229. ABA Civil Procedure Standard 11(c) allows communication between the court and

expert by "[pL]roviding that all communications between court and expert will be in writing with
copies to the parties." AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 82, at 20-21.
230. See supra Part I(D)(2)(c).
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scientific analysis of the disputed issues, which would greatly assist
their Daubertevidentiary rulings. Judges still would be required to go
through the Daubertfactors, but with information in hand from the
scientists, judges could make a much easier educated inspection of the
issues.
The scientists, acting as mediators, merely serve as a neutral third
party. The parties control the process, and in a sense adjudicate
portions of their dispute by removing issues from contention. The
jury and judge, however, do not lose any information in the process.
No longer would disputed issues still be presented to the judge and
jury as agreed upon, and disputed issues would simply be detailed for
easier understanding.
Parties may feel uncomfortable providing evidence to buttress
their claims or attack opposing claims that later might be included in
a written report that becomes part of a court record. However, the
parties themselves are in control of the written report (unlike reports
by special masters, traditional court-appointed experts or factfinders), and any evidence they put forth to support or dispute issues
during mediation could still be requested by the court under Federal
Rule of Evidence 705.331
In short, a pretrial mediation would reduce jury confusion and
aid judges' Daubert assessments. Furthermore, a scientist-conducted
pretrial mediation would be more efficient, both in terms of time and
money, because complex issues would be explored more rapidly and
in greater depth than if discussions were conducted by a nonscientist.
5.

An Example of the Proposed Mediation Method

The case in A Civil Action was tried first for causation. 232 The
issue was whether the defendants contaminated the city wells (i.e.,
whether TCE emanated from their properties and migrated to the
city wells)233
This issue depended upon testimony from
hydrogeologists, who relied on pump tests, computer models, and
associated calculations of groundwater flow.m
At the first pretrial meeting, the judge would identify the
231. FED. R. EVID. 705 stipulates that "[t]he expert may testify in terms of opinion or
inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless
the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination."
232. See HARR, supra note 36, at 286-87.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 332, 354-55.
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evidence from the hydrogeologists as technically challenging and
order mediation to detail this evidence. The parties would be allowed
to jointly select a mediator from a court list of qualified individuals
(with the required expertise and mediation training) or, in absence of
an agreement, the court would select the mediator.
The mediator would meet with the opposing experts and discuss
the issue of whether groundwater flowed from the defendants'
properties to the city wells.
Each expert would explain his
methodology and reasoning to the opposing expert. A defendant
expert would have had to explain his calculations, suggesting that
235
water from one defendant's property could not reach the city wells.
This expert would not have even gotten through his entire reasoning
because his reasoning was based on a calculation leading to an
impossible result. Accepting his conclusion and necessary underlying
calculation meant one defendant's property existed under ten feet of
water .3
During the real trial, as chronicled in A Civil Action, it took
portions of four days to finally elucidate the impossibility of the
expert's calculations and implausibility of his ultimate conclusion that
the city wells could not be contaminated from the direction of
defendants' properties. 237 It seems highly probable that a knowledgeable scientist-mediator directing the expert's reasoning and his
calculations would have taken far less time without taking jury time
or risking jury confusion.
Of course, as previously discussed, environmental science often
incorporates a variety of scientific specialties so there may be more
than one mediator needed for any particular case. It would be
possible, if necessary, for multiple mediations to occur simultaneously
38
with different opposing experts and mediators.2
CONCLUSION

The judiciary has not reconciled the tension between science and
law through rules governing the admittance of scientific evidence or
by judicial assessment of the validity of scientific testimony.
235. See id. at 353-55.
236. See id. at 359.
237. See id. at 353-62.
238. This is similar to the judicial use of expert panels discussed in Part I(D)(2)(b). The
advantage of the proposed mediation is that issues would be more quickly parsed both for
simplification and to see if there are areas of agreement before wasting trial time.
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Attempts to force science into a legal mold have resulted in
dissatisfaction among judges, juries, and scientists.
A pretrial mediation has the potential to reduce jury confusion
and provide nonscientific judges with guidance from scientists
regarding admissible evidence and testimony. Judicial oversight
would still be available and jurors would still obtain all pertinent
information (stipulations of undisputed issues and a refined guide to
the disputed issues). As a result, jury confusion would be reduced in
complex cases and science returned to an informational tool rather
than a tactic.

